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CUTTING VS. CHAVEZ:
A REPLY TO WOLF'S COMMENTS

WILLIAM H. PICKIlNS

I

AM GLAD my article "Bronson Cutting vs. Dennis Chavez: Battle
of the Patrones in New Mexico, 1934" (NMHR, vol. 46, 1971,
pp. 5-36) has provoked some controversy. Both "patrones" deserve
further comment if only for their domination of New Mexico
politics for thirty-five years. I also appreciate the time and effort
Professor Wolf has invested in his critique. I believe our debate
contains some fundamental disagreements about the best way to
apprQach the 1934 election as an historical event. Such disagreements have a broader importance than merely the Cutting-Chavez
story since they involve assumptions that guide historical research
from the beginning.
Perhaps the scope of the original article was too broad and general for such a relatively brief study; I concede that more evidence
is needed to clarify certain assertions. But, in accusing me of going
further than the evidence permits, Wolf overstates his own criticisms. My defense rests on two points.
First, Wolf ignores the stated purpose of the article. Beyond
the drama of the election, I sought "to illuminate the larger outlines of the New Deal in New Mexico and ways that depression
was shaping political consciousness" (p. 7).1 The research of
many scholars has produced substantial accounts of the political
lives of Cutting and Chavez and in particular of this election (pp.
6 and 30). I tried to summarize this research and offer broad interpretations from the summaries. So it is neither appropriate nor
accurate to use (as Wolf does) only the information in the article
for judgment. He criticizes my Jack of elaboration on several
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points. My answer is that he will find the details he demands in
such recent scholarship as Richard Beaupre's master's essay and
Gustav Seligmann's dissertation on Cutting's life, both of which
shaped my overview. It is regrettable that Seligmann's work has
not been published, and indeed that University presses have
given us no comprehensive work focussing on this period of New
Mexico's history.2
Within the space of twenty-five pages, then, my problem was to
identify the major historiographical issues and draw some conclusions without choking the article with clots of quotations or massive footnotes. If I might extend Wolf's parting analogy, I drove
few nails into the "historical" house because (I) the number of
nails I could use was limited; (2) many different-sized nails,
driven by others, had secured parts of the house before I arrived;
(3) my nails were meant for strategic points to hold the frame
together. The building inspector finds few nails driven by the
contractor because the walls, ceiling, and floor were well prefabricated.
Second, Professor Wolf's comments informed by political theory
are most perceptive. But he lacks familiarity with the actual events
of the national New Deal, recent historical judgments about its
course, and Cutting's place among Republicans in the U.S.
Senate. He is led to conclusions about the Thirties and Cutting's
national role which, regardless of how well they apply to most
theoretical situations, clearly distort this period in American history. Wolf makes much over my confusion of "the customary with
the unusual" and speaks often of rules,exceptions, deviations, and
patterns. My goal was more modest than the one he demands; I
wished to describe the reactions of two men to an urgent crisis (the
Great Depression) without regard to other crises or other men.
Generalizations about "the behavior of political elites," "general
situations," etc. in this particular case are largely unenlightening.
We should rather be concerned with speCifically what happened,
how it happened, and tentative conclusions about why it happened. I do not claim that New Mexico was unique or exceptional,
the pattern or the deviation. That is for others to decide. I merely
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attempted to summarize the findings of scholars and offer further
explanations based on their research and my own into the source
materials.
Two alternative responses to Professor Wolf's criticisms are
possible. I could attempt a point-by-point discussion of his questions and challenges, using additional information in narrow explanations and shaping it to meet his specific objections. This
strikes me as somewhat pedantic and of interest to a very small
number of readers. I have therefore decided to address my comments to Wolf's major criticisms while attempting to cover most
of his detailed suggestions at least by implication. Using this approach, lean provide more elaboration on the issues of substantial
importance in the Cutting-Chavez fight, the prime goal of the
original article. Perhaps Wolf and I can find some common ground
after all.
THE LABOR COMMISSIONER FIGHT AND THE GOP

OUR FIRST ARGUMENT comes over the Republican split of 1929.
Wolf suggests that I have cited "no evidence that demonstrates
the shrewdness" of Republican leaders in that year. Surely their
overwhelming victory in 1928 made possible by the coalition of
Springer, Dillon, and Cutting is "evidence" enough Cp. 9). National prosperity did not insure a triumph in New Mexico; a Republican split had lost the Governorship and a Senate seat during
the Coolidge sweep OLI924. Serious doubt existed that the three
wings of the GOP, especially the one dominated by the rebellious
Cutting, could work together in 1928. I quoted Hervey's doubts
on page 8. ''I'm absolutely independent," Cutting had said then,
''I'm almost fifty-fifty as far as the major parties are concerned."3
The Old Guard distrusted him to an extreme. "God forbid!" wrote
H. B. Hensley to Holm Bursum in August, "that the Republican
party should make the grievous mistake of sending [Cutting] to
the U.S. Senate . . . whose highest ambition seems to be never
to miss an opportunity to knife the Republican party."4
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In spite of this tension, Springer, Dillon, and Cutting did cooperate and so contributed their respective blocs (p. 9) to the
greatest victory in state history to that date. The compromises that
allowed this, unity resulted from shrewd trade-offs, the most significant being the Old Guard's (i.e. Springer's) acceptance of a
labor commissioner in the party's platform (p. 13) It is doubtful,
though little concrete evidence exists, that Springer's Republicans
thought Cutting would seriously push the commissioner idea. As
we know, he did-making it the major fight during the legislative
session. For reasons outlined on page 13, the Old Guard could not
accept the commissioner bill especially since its original form contained such absurdities as promotion of workers' organizations. On
February 13, 1929, Cutting's New Mexican declared that anticommissioner Republicans had repudiated the laboring man.
Charges followed that "the Republican Old Guard is keeping the
lower class in a state of serfdom."5 A battle began within the
GOP that lasted for twenty years.
In this regard, the article's point was that, though any faction
within a party desires dominance over the party's organization, the
central conflict in 1929 was ideological. Through Cutting and his
allies, Spanish-Americans along the Rio Grande and lower-class
Anglos along the Texas border and in the mines of New Mexico
began to demand a government that would actively meet their
needs. Wolf suggests that the commissioner fight was primarily
for party control and patronage. Surely these are ever-important
in American politics, but I think substantial evidence exists that
ideology was equally important. The commissioner fight involved
a struggle for ideological dominance of the Republican party in
New Mexico.6
I shall not elaborate much on the arguments between the
"Barons" and Cutting's "government expansionists" that appear
in the article, except to suggest that a reading of the New Mexican, the Albuquerque Journal, the New Mexico State Tribune,
and the Las Vegas Optic (the spectrum of editorial opinion)
during the legislative debates reveal arguments of a distinctly
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ideological hue. Time and again appear charges of "class legisla~
tion," "unfair government intervention," "the lower. class," and
"the natural course of the economy," phrases which had rarely
cropped up during Dillon's first term. 7 Such rhetoric may mask
personal power struggles, but in this case two further factors
persuade me to the contrary. I reiterate the contention that this
was a serious debate over which groups within the state should be
assisted by the government.
First, according to Gustav Seligmann, during this time Cutting
began to lose support from those upper- and middle-class "respectable people," mostly old Progressives, who disliked appeals to
class interest. During the commissioner fight and more so as the
Depression crept over America, Cutting openly suggested "fundamental reforms in the body politic" that might aid the lower
classes. We shall explore these reforms in later paragraphs; the
point is that in public office Cutting renewed a sense of commitment to an egalitarian philosophy he urged during the ProgressiveEra. "He went to the Senate in [late] 1927," Arthur Schlesinger Jr. writes, "and quickly won a place as a hard working and
courageous radical. . . . He conveyed in Washington a genuine
sense of aristocratic high principle, which he mingled somewhat
strangely with the tough political machine he maintained in New
Mexico."8
Schlesinger's comments have a balance (high principle and
tough political machine) that well reRect the two thrusts of Cutting's position on the labor commissioner. This leads to the
second reason for my conclusion that ideology played a strong
role in the commissioner battle. In spite of Cutting's "tough
machine," it is impossible to believe that in 1929 Cutting could
have gaineq control over the party's patronage or political machinery regardless of the commissioner controversy. Clearly Dillon.was
on the Old Guard's side. Aftet learning of Springer's adamant
opposition, the ,Governor disavowed his support for the bill. Bitter
words passed between Cutting and Dillon upon several occasions.
An embarrassed Dillon later blamed Cutting for the mistakes that
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forced a special session of the Legislature to untangle knots
caused by "the crowding and confusion during the last days of the
[regular] session."9
Likewise, the Old Guard could hardly have believed that the
national Administration would smile on Cutting. He was notorious for political irregularity. By 1929 he had switched parties
four times. One story circulated, according to Erna Fergusson,
that "when Senator Cutting presented himself in the U .S.Senate, [the Sargeant-at-Arms] asked on which side of the chamber
he wished to be seated: was he a Democrat or a Republican?"
Indeed, by 1930 the New Mexican Senator had lost what patronage he gained by his support of Hoover in 1928.10
It is therefore difficult to believe that the Old Guard feared
Cutting's control over party machinery in 1929 if his only resource
had been his money and maneuvers in the capitol's cloakrooms.
Cutting's "tough machine" operated best outside the confines of
formal party structures. l l On the other hand, his ideological appeal
for a coalition based on lower-class support was a threat not only
to Old Guard domination of the Republican party but also to
their power in New Mexico politics. This ideological struggle
became even clearer during the desperate years after the commissioner fight.
c

THE ISSUE OF A PHILOSOPHY OF GOVERNMENT

PROFESSOR WOLF ignores both my intention in discussing the
views of Cutting and Chavez about government and the historical
context for these views. I intended no disquisition on "general
political philosophies," delegate theories, etc., such as Wolf provides. Rather, my goal was to define "ways that depression was
shaping political consciousness" (p. 7). Throughout the article
appears the theme of the economic responsibilities of government:
the labor commissioner battle, "state government . . . protecting
their property and employing about a thousand [party members],"
"rhetoric tailored to the economic crisis," "government had to
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have powers to strike directly at evils produced by an industrial
society" (pp. 19, 22, 25).
Even the hastiest overview of the Hoover years indicates that
debates increasingly centered on the wisdom of Federal intervention in the economy and on national relief. The sort of discussion
that Wolf provides for several pages literally became academic as
the American economy hit bottom in 1932-33. Rarely have the
fundamental responsibilities of our government been scrutinized
with such passion and solutions thrust forward with such vigor.
Swept into this debate were traditions and totems· of American
life whose enduring wisdom had been questioned earlier by only
the most profane. In this regard, I cannot resist one challenge:
"defense of the constitution and popular sovereignty in no way
make Chavez distinctive. Can we cite any American politician
who would deny these principles? I doubt it," says Wolf. "The
doctrine of the infallibility of the Holy American Constitution
was decidedly sour," said Cutting, ". . . [We should] pitch .. :
a lot of that ancient and venerable document into the trash
can. . . . It could well be rewritten." Comparing Depression to
war, Al Smith asked in 1933, "And what does a democracy do in
war? It becomes a tyrant, a despot, a real monarch." "Give the
President for a year the widest and fullest powers," suggested
Walter Lippman a few days later. I2
My point about the Cutting-Chavez differences is illustrated by
their actions in Congress. During the crisis the question of government leadership (and leadership within the government itself)
became acute. It was no longer enough to rely, as Dennis Chavez
said he did, on "the will of the people" (p. 18) and vague notions
of popular sovereignty. Americans and New Mexicans literally
had no "will" if that term implies a consensus about measures
against Depression. From a thousand respected voices came com~
plaints, threats, suggestions, panaceas. In the face of this, several
scholars have noted that the dominant mood in America was not
anger, not revolutionary zeal, not determination for real change,
so much as a confusion of hopelessness. I3
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Forcefully and continuously, Cutting led or supported attempts
by "Republicans of the left wing" (Hoover's phrase) to employ
the resources of the Federal government for massive public works,
relief, and economic reform. Before the New Deal, Cutting introduced a five-billion-dollar works bill, helped organize Senators
behind the LaFollette-Costigan relief measure, authored legislation· providing assistance for transients, strongly opposed cuts in
government salaries and budget balancing, and "assailed
[Hoover's] relief program as a 'wavering policy which left the
country facing the alternatives of starvation or revolt.' " During the
Roosevelt years, Cutting broadened his concerns, introducing
measures to nationalize credit, provide wider coverage for the
elderly than the Administration proposed, organize consumer
groups, grant relief to striking workers, and assist\ the nation's
schools with Federal funds. By 1933 Cutting had become the
Senate's leading spokesmanfor veterans' benefits. He consistently
stressed the "fundamental need for national planning to equate
consumption with production." Cutting's leadership prompted
a writer for the New Republic to conclude that he had "perhaps
the greatest understanding of the modern trend in government."
"His radicalism may be no deeper than that of Norris or 'Young
Bob' LaFollette," wrote Frederick Barkley i~ Sons of the Wild
Jackass, "but it is broader and more encompassing."14
In contrast, although Dennis Chavez did riot vote solidly with
the "conservative" Democrats (he opposed their national sales tax,
veterans' cuts, and the Roosevelt Economy bill), he never assumed leadership on any major measure nor was his record
consistent in regard to government expansion. Mainly, Cutting
and Chavez disagreed about the need for national, coordinated
efforts against the Depression as opposed to local measures (a
point made in the article). One may question Cutting's solutions
for the Great Depression (this seems the trend now in New Deal
historiography).15 Nevertheless, it is clear that Cutting and the
other Progressives assumed leadership long before the advent of
Roosevelt and offered a viable program for economic. reform and
government responsibility for unemployment. As Hofstadter tells
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us Cp. 29), they were not better equipped than conservatives to
understand the paradoxes of the Great Crash in 1929. But they
were, according to Seligmann, "ideologically prepared to extend
the scope of government when no other means could succeed."
This was the major political issue during the height of the economic crisis. "Reform in the 1930'S," William Leuchtenberg
writes, "meant economic reform."16 On one side" of this debate,
Bronson Cutting took a forceful and consistent stand.
CUTTING AS A NATIONAL FIGURE
AND HIS IMAGE WITH NEW MEXICANS

PROFESSOR WOLF is correct to emphasize the difficulty in establishing voter motivation with any precision. Certainly Cutting
made effective use of his money, his political ties, and his newspapers Cpp. 7-8, 26). Certainly the 1934 Senate vote was dramatically close. In view of growing Democratic majorities, the popularity of Dennis Chavez, and the opposition of the powerful FDR,
the surprising element is that Cutting won at all. My contention
is not that Cutting's ideology was the only factor in the election,
but rather that it was a major factor in dividing the voters both
for and against the Republican.
Professor Wolf's most misinformed assertion is that Cutting
was not a national figure. Although I respect the N ew York
Times, we should not let it be the definitive source of a man's
reputation, as Wolf does. Cutting's major fights in Congress-for
Philippine independence, for veterans' assistance, against the
Smoot Anti-obscenity proposal-were given wide coverage and
especially endeared him to liberal intelligentsia. "Cutting is the
Senate's leading liberal," announced aNew York newsman after
the obscenity fight, "the Senate's most astonishing man." "He is
today one of the most intelligent and clearthinking of the insurgents," Drew Pearson concluded. "That he" is himself the most
intelligent and cultured man in the Progressive group," Owen
White wrote in American Mercury, "is generally admitted by the
gentlemen of the press." In the Senate there were "none of greater
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national stature," according to Hiram Johnson. "Outstanding as
a national liberal," was William Keleher's appraisal in his Memoirs. 17 Cutting spoke frequently on national radio. Several times
he was mentioned for'the Presidency, even by Huey Long (the
Senator whom Wolf insists dwarfed Cutting in national prominence). He even appears in Mary McCarthy's The Group as "a
fighting gentleman Progressive." "It would be difficult to conceive of a greater blow to the progressive-radical movement in
America than his death," wrote Common Sense in 1935. 18
Cutting has also entered the exclusive company of politiCians
mentioned by our leading historians. He appears on fourteen
separate occasions in Schlesinger's three volumes on the New
Deal. In one of the finest single volumes on the period, Leuchtenberg's Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Cutting is quoted or cited four
times. Even recent scholarship on the Hoover Administration
finds a place for Cutting. 19 Allegations of his greatness might be
denied; Cutting's national prominence should not be.
I can hear Professor Wolf saying "So what? Where's the evidence that New Mexicans knew of or cared about Cutting's
reputation as a leading Progressive?" There is no precise measure
for public knowledge, ,of course, but it seems clear the voters were
frequently exposed to the Senator's left-wing ideology. Cutting
often made the point that his repudiation of the Republican Party
in 1932 was based on its conservatism and that his readoption of
the party in 1934 was conditioned on acceptance of his ideology.
"He has been pretty consistently lib~ral," the Albuquerque
Tribune said grudgingly in early 1934. That year the GOP platform was "even more liberal than the New Deal," according to
Fleta Springer in the New Republic. "Cutting was a New Dealer,"
Seligmann contends, "before most of the New Mexico politiCians
had realized that it existed." Although considered a moderate
before 1934, Dennis Chavez became "recognized as the leader of
conservatives among the Democrats," the Farmington Times-Hustler alleged, "[Chavez and the Democrats] are rallying the conservatives of all parties under their banner to defeat the liberal
Senator Cutting."2O
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More indicationsof Cutting's ideology came from endorsements.
All nationally known progressives supported him; many traveled
to New Mexico to say so. His support" of Labor was recognized by
the" A.F. of L. and its President, William Green. The radical
Farmers' Holiday Association wanted him returned to Congress.
John E. Miles, state Democratic chairman in 1934, charged "that
Bronson Cutting contributed to the Communist party, both national and local." The Senator never denied such contributions.
Clyde Tingley, the Democrat for Governor, called Cutting "a
disgrace" since Herbert Hoover believed him "a dangerous radical." As Professor Wolf admits, New Mexicans were not accustomed to such a national storm over their politicians. My bet is
that many of Cutting's statements seeped into the public's consciousness, abetted by comments of others all along the political"
spectrum. "Party lines have been wiped out," Owen White said
in Colliers, "everybody is either for or against Cutting."21
ROOSEVELT'S ENDORSEMENT OF DENNIS CHAVEZ

PROFESSOR WOLF declares that Presidents simply do not endorse
candidates outside their own party in any but the most unusual
circumstances. He cites a variety of obvious risks that dissuade the
national leader from such endorsements (including the injunction
that "Presidents are also aware that incumbents have a marked
advantage in getting re-elected." Need we be reminded that Cutting was the incumbent?) Wolf's comments are pertinent to most
situations. I. suggest, however, that his theory of Presidential endorsements, along with a superficial knowledge of New Deal coalitions in Congress, leads him to notable errors about the particular
case of New Mexico's Senate seat in 1934.
First, I get the impression from Wolf's writing that he thinks
Franklin Roosevelt had a series of consistent proposals in a reform
package for America. These were called "the New Deal." Wolf
speaks of FDR being "moved by votes for his programs not by
campaign oratory." So, we can total up the votes of Cutting and
Chavez for the President's "programs" to discover how much
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support each gave to "the New DeaL" Using proposals that came
to have Presidential approval before Congressional passage, a
hasty search of the Congressional Record indicates about equal
support. More important than this exercise is the point made by
many post-Schlesinger scholars. They conclude that the New Deal
was not a set of "programs" drawn by the Administration but
rather attempts by Roosevelt to coordinate various groups so they
could frame proposals. 22 "Gradually, haltingly, incoherently, almost haphazardly another possibility was emerging," .writes Ellis
Hawley about the Administration's reaction to the problems of
monopoly, "one that sprang not from any preconceived plan, but
rather from the process of political compromise, the conflict of
ideals, and the interplay of power between rival pressure groups."
Hawley's description applies well to most of Roosevelt's "programs." The President's greatest strength was his ability to draw
groups into the power structure, to give them aid and encouragement, and to elicit their ideas which he might then endorse. His
passion was to please as many organized groups in America as possible. "Weave them together!" Roosevelt told a speechless Raymond Moley after reading two contradictory tariff proposals. The
President's gift was not formulation of his own program, but
making room for the programs of others. 23
The Senate Progressives had a program. Their ranks varied,
but the most consistent members were Robert Wagner, George
Norris, William Borah, Gerald Nye, Burton Wheeler, Huey Long
(in his milder moments), Edward Costigan, Robert LaFollette
Jr., Hiram Johnson, and Bronson Cutting. Always full of "an
instinctive sympathy for the underdog" as Senator Borah put it,
these Progressives had kept a determined vigil during the Hoover
years, alone pressing the President for substantial relief measures
and social legislation. They were inflamed by the abuses of big
business they found everywhere. Cutting was particularly abusive
about Hoover's "trickle-down theory" of relief whereby money
from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation would gradually
reach the masses after the great corporations were saved. A conference called by these Progressives in 193 I received wide publi-
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city for its strong proposals and commendations from Governor
Franklin Roosevelt of New York. Urging government action
against monopolies, for labor unions and public works and small
farmers, and nationalization of key industries, these Progressives
were loud when aroused and sternly critical of those men and
ideas which the middle-class community often held in high regard. 24
Although they increasingly disagreed with Roosevelt as the
New Deal unfolded, the President respected many of their
efforts. "They were inventive and they knew how to carry on a
dialogue" so that even had Roosevelt disagreed with their goals,
the Progressives would have played a significant role in so experimental an administration. Most New Deal measures with the
sharpest breaks from the past (strong control over credit, public
ownership of power facilities, steeply graduated income tax,
Federal assistance for labor unions) came from out of their midst.
Though the great majority of their votes went for New Deal
legislation, they criticized the President for ending the CWA, for
allowing price collusion under NRA, for permitting. company
unions, and for deBationary tactics such as the Economy Act of
1933 and veterans' cuts. Still, they consistently defended the New
Deal against charges of socialism, communism, and unreasonable
attacks on business. Even in their most heated disagreements with
Roosevelt, theirs was an anger of disappointment, not disavowal:
"complaints . . . about an erring brother."25
Roosevelt had other reasons to be fond of these Progressives. His
political life up to the Presidency had been part of their tradition.
During the Depression he came to share their attitude about the
stupidity and excesses of many businessmen, especially financiers.
He agreed that government must help "the Forgotten American."
Though Roosevelt's reformist zeal was tempered by place and
circumstance, at times he shared the concern of Senate Progressives that politics be conducted along lines of ideology rather than
expediency. His attempted purge of Southern Democrats in 1938
was based on his announced "right to intervene in elections
whenever there was a clear issue of principle." "If we have the

350

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW XLVII:4 1972

right kind of people," Roosevelt told the press in 1934 with
overtones for the Progressives, "the party label· does not mean
so very much." He then endorsed laFollette and Johnson that
year and Norris against a Democrat two years later. On a wintry
night in Albany, the President-elect had told Tugwell: "We'll
have eight years in Washington. By that time there may not be a
Democratic party, but there will be a progressive one."26
It is questionable, of course, that Roosevelt was completely
serious about reorienting the parties on ideological grounds. I
think Roosevelt disagreed, not with the ultimate justice of the
Progressives' cause, but with their "rugged individualism" in
politics. Conservatives struck with the power of a clenched fist,
the President said, while "the progressives are like a man trying
to strike with his fingers spread out stiffly. He would accomplish
nothing and would very likely break his fingers." Though he did
not share their temperament or sense of righteousness, the President's sympathies reveal an admiration for the lonely grandeur of
the Progressives' struggle. They were pure though sometimes
tragic types, at least in the halls of Congress. "If Franklin had not
been a Roosevelt," Tugwell reflected, "I am quite certain he would
have liked to be a LaFollette."27
As business became disillusioned with the New Deal in 1934;
as there rose a "resurgence on the right," and as critics such as
Father Coughlin, Huey Long, and Dr. Townsend captured the
popular imagination with demagoguery (Roosevelt's view), the
President came to depend more on the Senate's "responsible"
Progressives. In short, Roosevelt's political traditions as well as
practical considerations led him toward the Republicans among
the Progressives, including Bronson Cutting. 28
. Here is where Professor Wolf's opinion on the .President's endorsement of Chavez is faulty. Most contemporary commentators
and later 'historians have found the endorsement quite problematical. As "a persistent student of New Mexico politics," Wolf
should be aware that the decision Roosevelt faced in 1934 was
not between Cutting and Chavez as single votes in Congress nor
between merely the Republican and Democratic parties. Rather,
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Chavez was a member of an amorphous, Democratic majority that
had little in common except for party affiliation and respect for
the President's awesome power at this time. On the other hand,
Cutting was a member of a small though powerful band of Senate Progressives, bound together by what they perceived as "the
interest of the little man." I
Nor was Cutting on the periphery of these Senators. Bitter
exchanges occurred between the Progressives and Roosevelt about
his support for Chavez. "I took the opportunity," Harold Ickes
said at campaign's end, 1934, "to tell [FDR] that the opposition of
the Administration to Senator Cutting of New Mexico had
created a bad feeling among the Progressives of the West. Senator
Johnson was very much worked up." Later, George Norris spoke
bitterly of "the disgraceful and unwarranted fight made to drive
Senator Cutting out of public office. .. . It is a blot upon the
record of the Administration." Heartened by Cutting's victory, the
Progressives were again furious that Roosevelt did not quash the
election contest of Dennis Chavez for Cutting's seat. "It was quite
the most upsetting political development of last week," Raymond
Swing'said in the Nation, "for it throws into doubt the President's
entire informal alliance with the Progressives. . . ." The article
concluded that even Democratic leaders opposed the contest.~
Cutting's death in 1935 revealed the depths of affection these
Progressives had for the New Mexican. Norris wept openly on
the Senate Hoor. Borah, his face Hushed with grief, told the New
York Times "it is one of those times that you have no language to
express yourself." Huey Long" 'broke down' and cried" when an
aide rushed to him with the news. Bob LaFollette could not bring
himself to the Senate that day and later named one of his sons
after his friend. "So many of us could have been more easily
spared," said Senator Nye. "No man has performed more signal
service," said Senator Johnson. This tragic death, New York
Senator Wagner told reporters, "deprives the nation of a great
leader who understood these critical times as few men have;"
"Cutting was unique among the Progressives," Schlesinger wrote
later, "and adored by them."30
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. The point is that President Roosevelt was well aware of the
risk he was taking in turning his back on Cutting in .1934- The
Senator was a popular incumbent not stained by the repudiated
Republicanism of Hoover. He was in the inner. circle of a group
of Senators whose support the Administration badly needed.
Cutting's triumphant return to the Senate would mean a political
reputation enhanced tenfold by victory over a powerful President's
opposition. Chavez in the Senate could hardly have been so important to. Roosevelt or Democratic unity.. In the article I offered
one among several explanations for Roosevelt's action. Professor
Wolf may justifiably argue that others were more important. To
insist, however, that the Chavez endorsement is not an important
problem in political historiography simply ignores the events and
their context. In this case a theory of Presidential endorsements
must give way to the historical situation.
CONCLUSION

REGARDLESS of Wolf's many astute criticisms, I believe the major
points in my article still stand. Even though Cutting was erratic in
political alliances, switched party labels often, and was guilty of
tough-minded opportunism, his ideology about government's role
in social and economic affairs remained consistent over these years.
Cutting tried to bring lower-class New Mexicans into a political
coalition based on their economic interests. Hewas a "radical" who
supported massive government intervention in the economy, elaborate systems of security for workers and consumers, and strict
regulation of private enterprise. He was a national leader who
brought the Senate Progressives' solutions for Depression to the
public in a forceful and articulate way. Roosevelt opposed Cutting
in 1934 only after careful thought, a good deal of political risk,
and an awareness that Cutting was a rival to his own leadership.
My thanks to the New Mexico Historical Review for publishing
this exchange. Also, thanks to my friend and former teacher, T.
Phillip Wolf; I shall try to return the "favor" some day. Perhaps
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our dialogue has revealed some problems of examining history 'as
well as reviewing a fascinating period in. New' Mexico politics.
Each of us is' likely guilty of being "intellectual" in' the sense
President Eisenhower used the term: "a man who takes more
words than are necessary to tell more than he knows."
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I. Pages cited in the text refer to my article. Footnotes refer to quo-;
tations and information included here.
. .
2. I can testify to the difficulty of publishing in this area. Though a
solid book with a wealth of information, Jack Holme~' Politics in. New
Mexico has a sort of "science~' dryness.that has restricted sales, apparently,
and f\lils to convey the flavor of politics during the Twenties and Thirties.
Publishers around the state have therefor~.become reluctant to accept any
scholarly piece on this Period, preferring some glamorized personal-mirrative account. The extent of my activities has been reading papers on the
New Deal at the Missouri Valley Historical Association and a Phi Alpha
Theta conference in Las Cruces. I have submitted a manuscript for publication as a chapter in, an anthology of stat~ New Deals, but its fate is
uncertain as of now.
.
3. Francis McGarity, "Bronson Cutting, Senator from New Mexico"
(M.A. thesis, Columbia University, 1934), p. 7.
4. H. B. Hensley to Holm Bursum, Aug. I, 1928, Holm O. Bursum
Papers, File on "Political Matters, 1926-9," Zimmerman Library, UJ;liver~
sity of New Mexico. See also Erna Fergusson, "Clyde Tingley," p. 220.
Unpublished Manuscript, Zimmerman Library, UNM. Charles B. Judah,
Governor Richard C: Dillon: A Study in New Mexico Politics, (Department of Government Bulletin, no. 19, University of New Mexico, 1948),
p. 30. Gustav. L. Seligmann, "The Political Career of Bronson Cutting"
(Ph.D. dissertation, University of Arizona, 1967), pp. 71-73.
5. Herbert Theodore Hoover, "History of the Republican Party in
New Mexico, 1867-1952" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oklahoma,
1966), p. 158. For a detailed account of the fight, see Vorley M. Rexroad,
"The Two Administrations of Governor Richard C. Dillon" (M.A. thesis,
University of New Mexico, 1947), pp. 11-23. I cannot help mentioning
Wolf's lecture about the difference between "the votes" of wealthy GOP
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me~bers and their financial support for the party. I think we are all aware,
as he belabors the point, that the resources, influence, and opinion leadership are the ingredients of power for the wealthy, not the strength of theif
votes. If he felt I meant "votes" so narrowly, my apologies.·
6. To illustrate the ways Republicans were responding to the needs
of lower-class New Mexicans, I would point out that the 1929 legislature
increased appropriations and assistance for the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District (after complaints by Spanish-Americans about assessments), passed a much stronger Workmen's Compensation bill, and almost
doubled the amount spent in fiscal 1927 for state government. See Rexroad, pp. 136-37. New Mexico Tax Bulletin, 10 (1931), p. 83. In response
to Wolfs call for clarification of a "logical inconsistency" about Republican
factionalism during the 1929 Legislature, I offer the fpllowing synopsis of
the original article: (1). Cutting and Labor. Cutting 'had consistently supported '1abor" as against the interests of "management" since 1 925 (pp.
7-8). In October, 1928, he outlined a broad program to strengthen the
laborer's position in the economy (Santa Fe New Mexican, Oct. 20-25,
1928). "Cutting gave a great deal of his campaign time to the labor vote
in the state," says a biographer of Richard Dillon (Rexroad, p. 97). He
criticized the use of troops to break strikes and suggested that government
needed to assist the weak, the helpless, the unorganized in America. Both
Santa Fe and Washington, Cutting suggested in 1932 continuing this
theme, should '1ook out for the underdog and the underprivileged man"
(McGarity, p. 40). (2). Cutting Felt Betrayed in his Attempt to Gain
Labor V~s for the GOP. It is my feeling from reading newspaper accounts of the Legislature and some of Cutting's correspondence then, that
the Senator was taken aback by the enormous opposition that developed
to' the labor commissioner. After all, Republicans had used it as a campaign pledge. Governor Dillon endorsed the commissioner in his address
to the Legislature. Most Democrats seemed favorable, at least until it
became a factional issue among Republicans. Democrats became the
balance of power then. (3). The Older Interpretation that Party PoWer
was the Major Issue. I am puzzled by Wolfs question of referent for the
phrase "such a view insists" (p. 14). He asks is the "view" mine or Andrea
Parker's? The phrase clearly refers to Parker's view: I have expressed
none of my own opinions about the Old Guard's motivations up to this
point in the text. The phrase immediately follows others such as "the
usual explanation ... [Parker] continues this interpretation," and Parker's analysis of the motivations within the quotation. Such a view (I hope
the referent is clear now) argues along lines similar to Wolf that the
commissioner fight was primarily for party control and patronage.
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